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PROJECT LIFE, INC. V. GLENDE."NING: 1 SEEKING SANCTUARY FOR
WOMEN RECOVERING FROM SUBSTANCE ABUSE PROBLEMS
I.

INTRODUCTION

Discrimination against people with disabilities is widespread
throughout America. 2 From the simple failure of businesses and
schools to provide easy access for users of wheelchairs, to the more
deeply ingrained and insidious personal prejudices held by Americans
from all walks of life,3 Americans with disabilities have long faced discrimination in varied forms.
Congress has attempted to address the problem of discrimination
against the disabled with such initiatives as the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)4 and the Fair Housing Act (FHA).5 The ADA provides
redress for discrimination against the disabled in the areas of employment, services and facilities, and public accommodations. 6 Similarly,
the FHA protects the disabled from discrimination in the purchase
1. 139 F. Supp. 2d 703 (D. Md. 2001).
2. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the U!1iv. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 391-424
(2001) (Breyer,]., dissenting) (cataloging submissions to the Task Force on
Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities describing specific
instances of discrimination against people with disabilities).
3. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Carney, 598 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1979). Despite a record
replete with expert testimony that a quadriplegic custodial father was a fit
parent and fully capable of providing a healthy family environment for his
children, the trial judge ordered a change of custody to the mother based
solely on his prediction that the father's disability would render him unable
to have a "normal relationship" with his children. Id. at 40-41. The Supreme Court of California reversed, holding that the trial judge erred in
ordering a change of custody when the evidence failed to establish that the
father's disability would have an adverse effect on the best interests of the
children. Id. at 44-45.
The U.S. House of Representatives recognized that much of the discrimination faced by the disabled in America results not from any evil intent, but rather from simple carelessness:
Discrimination against people with disabilities results from actions
or inactions that discriminate by effect as well as by intent or design. Discrimination also includes harms resulting from the construction of transportation, architectural, and communication
barriers or the adoption or application of standards, criteria, practices or procedures that are based on thoughtlessness or indifference-that discrimination resulting from benign neglect.
H.R. REp. No. 101-485 (II), at 29 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,
310-11.
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2001).
5. Id. §§ 3601-3631.
6. Id. §§ 12112, 12118.
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and rental of dwellings and in the provision of services and facilities in
connection with dwellings. 7
Discrimination against disabled Americans, however, often takes
subtler forms than the failure of businesses to employ the disabled or
to provide necessary services or facilities to the disabled. 8 In Project
Life, Inc. v. Glendening, a jury and the United States District Court for
the District of Maryland took important steps toward leveling the playing field for people with disabilities by extending the protections of
the ADA and the FHA to the potential clientele of a non-profit organization-women recovering from substance abuse problems. 9 The
court held that the Maryland Port Authority's delay in leasing a berth
at the Baltimore Harbor to Project Life, to serve as a docking place for
the U.S.S. Sanctuary-a decommissioned naval hospital ship that Project Life had planned to use as a residential rehabilitation center for
women recovering from substance abuse-violated both the ADA IO
and the FHA. I 1 In so holding, the court also refused to allow the State
of Maryland to avoid liability for these ADA and FHA violations by
invoking its Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.I2
The Project Life decision has immense positive implications for the
plight of people recovering from substance abuse in Maryland and,
potentially, throughout the country. In 1999, an estimated 59,000
substance abusers lived in Baltimore City alone. I3 The Project Life decision sends two clear messages: First, the refusal to provide access to
7. Id. § 3604.
8. See supra note 3.
9. 139 F. Supp. 2d 703, 705, 711 (D. Md. 2001). For several years, courts have
upheld claims of discrimination brought by recovering substance abusers,
or organizations that serve recovering substance abusers, under the ADA
and the FHA. See, e.g., MX Group, Inc. v. Covington, 293 F.3d 326, 328 (6th
Cir. 2002) (affirming the lower court's finding that a city zoning ordinance
excluding methadone clinics constituted discrimination against recovering
substance abusers in violation of the ADA); United States v. S. Mgmt. Corp.,
955 F.2d 914, 916 (4th Cir. 1992) (affirming an injunction issued against an
apartment management group that refused to lease apartments to a community drug- and alcohol-abuse rehabilitation program because of animus
toward the program's clients in violation of the FHA); Hispanic Counseling
Ctr., Inc. v. Hempstead, 237 F. Supp. 2d 284, 287, 293 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)
(granting a preliminary injunction on a claim that a zoning amendment
preventing a non-profit substance abuse treatment center from relocating
to a new building constituted discrimination against the treatment center's
clients in violation of the ADA); Smith-Berch, Inc. v. Baltimore County, 68
F. Supp. 2d 602,606 (D. Md. 1999) (denying a defendant-county's motion
for summary judgment on a plaintiff-methadone clinic's ADA claim that
the county discriminated against the plaintiff's opiate-addicted clients by
denying permits for the construction of a methadone treatment facility).
10. Project Life, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d at 706-07.
11. See id. at 711.
12. See id. at 707 n.5.
13. Baltimore City Health Dept., Baltimore City 1999 Health Status Report,
available at http://www.ci.baltimore.md.us/government/health/1999status
report/abuse.html.
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services and facilities to groups seeking to help this segment of the
population, simply because of negative public sentiment against such
people, violates the ADA and the FHA; and second, such discrimination can find redress under those statutes.
Part II of this Comment discusses the history and applicable provisions of the ADA and the FHA; the states' immunity under the Eleventh Amendment; Congress's abrogation of that immunity under the
ADA; the ongoing dispute over the validity of that abrogation in the
wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 14 and the injunctive relief that remains available in the absence of monetary damages. Part III analyzes the
decision in Project Life, Inc. v. Glendening and concludes that the court
correctly found violations of both the ADA and the FHA in the actions
of the Maryland Port Authority and extended the relief provided by
those statutes to Project Life. Additionally, Part III asserts that the
Fourth Circuit has taken a misguided position on the validity of Congress's abrogation of the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity and
that the Supreme Court should step in and clarify the applicability of
its holding in Garrett. Finally, Part IV concludes that, whatever the
Supreme Court's ultimate decision on the applicability of Garrett to
Title II of the ADA, the Project Life decision exemplifies the injunctive
relief available to plaintiffs for state-sanctioned violations of the ADA
and the FHA.
II.

BACKGROUND

A.

TheADA

1.

History

Congress enacted the ADA in 1990 as a response to the established
and growing problem of discrimination against individuals with disabilities. 15 Mter hearing testimony from countless organizations and
individuals concerning the problem of discrimination against the disabled in America, Congress found "a compelling need to establish a
clear and comprehensive Federal prohibition of discrimination on the
basis of disability in the areas of employment in the private sector,
public accommodations, public services, transportation, and telecommunications."16 Section 12101 of the ADA sets out nine congressional
findings that precipitated the passage of the Act. 17 Specifically, Congress found that "some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physicalor mental disabilities,"18 and that these disabled Americans are
14. 531 V.S. 356 (2001).
15. See 42 V.S.C. § 12101 (a) (2001).
16. H.R. REp. No. 101-485(11), at 28 (1990), reprinted in 1990 V.S.C.C.A.N. 303,
310.
17. 42 V.S.C. § 12101(a).
18. [d. § 12101(a)(I).
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historically isolated from society and face discrimination in myriad areas. 19 In addition, Congress found that, "unlike individuals who have
experienced discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, national
origin, religion or age," disabled individuals often lack "legal recourse
to redress such discrimination."2o Congress further found that discrimination against disabled Americans takes many different forms,21
and that such discrimination "costs the United States billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and
non productivity. "22
Based on its findings concerning discrimination against disabled
Americans, Congress enacted the ADA with several concrete purposes
in mind, each serving the overarching goal of eliminating discrimination against disabled individuals. 23 According to the ADA, the purposes of the act include: Providing a "national mandate" for
eradicating the problem of discrimination against the disa,bled;24 establishing specific standards for addressing discrimination against
people with disabilities;25 and securing the participation of the federal
government in the enforcement of ADA standards. 26 Significantly,
Congress's fourth and final avowed purpose behind the ADA is "to
invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to
enforce the fourteenth amendment" to help remedy the problem of
discrimination against people with disabilities. 27

2.

Individuals with Substance Abuse Problems are Disabled Within
the Meaning of the ADA

Congress's intent that the ADA have a far-reaching scope manifests
itself in the very broad definition of the term "disability" provided by
the Act. 28 For purposes of the rights and remedies provided by the
19. Id. § 12101 (a)(2)-(3). Significant areas in which Congress found widespread discrimination to exist include "employment, housing, public accommodations, education, transportation, communication, recreation,
institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to public services."
Id. § 12101 (a) (3).
20. Id. § 12101(a)(4).
21. See id. § 12101(a)(5). According to Congress, discrimination against disabled individuals can take widely different forms, from "outright intentional exclusion" to "relegation to lesser services, programs, activities,
benefits, jobs, or other opportunities." Id.
22. Id. § 12101(a)(9).
23. See generally id. § 12101(b).
24. Id. S 12101(b)(1).
25. See id. § 12101(b)(2).
26. See id. § 12101(b)(3).
27. Id. § 12101(b)(4). Indeed, Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment plays a central role in its subsequent abrogation of the state's
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of
Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
28. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). That Congress intended the ADA to have
a wide scope is also evidenced by language describing the purpose of the
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ADA, the Act defines "disability" as "a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such
individual. "29
The ADA itself does not provide an exhaustive list, or any list at all,
of specific kinds of physical or mental impairments that qualify as "disabilities" for purposes of the Act. 30 Individuals recovering from substance abuse problems, however, do fit within the broad definition of
individuals with disabilities provided by the ADA. 31
The text of the ADA provides some guidance on whether or not
drug addiction constitutes a disability within the meaning of the
ADA. 32 A person who currently uses drugs is not considered an individual with a disability under the ADA and, thus, is not protected from
discrimination. 33 Recovering substance abusers, however, are considered individuals with disabilities under the ADA. 34 Courts have also

29.

30.
3l.

32.
33.

34.

act as providing "a clear and comprehensive national mandate" for eliminating discrimination against disabled individuals. [d. § 12101(b)(I).
[d. § 12102(2)(A). The group of individuals protected by the ADA is further expanded by the additional definitions of the term "disability" as a
record of a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of such an individual or "being regarded as
having such an impairment." [d. § 12102(2)(B)-(C).
See infra note 34.
In its memorandum opinion on the Project Life defendants' initial motion to
dismiss, the court stated: "there is no dispute that ... an individual recovering from substance abuse is an individual with a disability under the ADA."
Project Life, Inc. v. Glendening, No. WMN-98-2163, 1998 WL 1119864, at
*2 (D. Md. Nov. 30, 1998).
See generally 42 U.S.C. § 12210.
See id. § 1221O(a) ("For purposes of this chapter, the term 'individual with a
disability' does not include an individual who is currently engaging in the
illegal use of drugs, when a covered entity acts on the basis of such use.").
The Code of Federal Regulations defines "current use of illegal drugs" as
use that "occurred recently enough to justify a reasonable belief that a person's drul? use is current or that continuing drug use is a real and ongoing
problem.' 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2003). Thus, some courts have held that
certain plaintiffs were not entitled to protection under the ADA because
their drug use presented a "real and ongoing problem," even though they
had taken steps to address their drug problems. See 1 Americans with Disabilities: Practice and Compliance Manual § 2:5 (2003) (citing Wormley v.
Arkla, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 1079 (E.D. Ark. 1994) (denying a plaintiff's claim
that his termination constituted disability discrimination in violation of the
ADA where the evidence showed that he had violated the terms of a reinstatement agreement by relapsing in his drug use, despite the fact that he
was drug-free and had just completed a rehabilitation program at the time
of his termination); Colo. State Bd. of Med. Exam' rs v. Davis, 893 P .2d 1365
(Colo. Ct. App. 1995) (denying a drug-addicted doctor's claim that the revocation of his medical license violated the ADA because of evidence of frequent relapses, despite his past and present participation in rehabilitation
programs)) .
See 42 U.S.C. § 1221O(b). The ADA provides that while a current drug user
is not considered an "individual with a disability for the purposes of the
ADA, a person who "has successfully completed a supervised drug rehabilitation program," has "otherwise been rehabilitated successfully," or "is par-
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consistently recognized that individuals recovering from substance
abuse are disabled within the meaning of the ADA. 35

3.

Title II of the ADA: Protections of the Disabled Against Discrimination in the Provision of Services by a Public Entity

In addition to the protections provided by the ADA in the areas of
employment and public accommodations, Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination against the disabled in the provision of services by a
public entity.36 Title II provides that "no qualified individual with a
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such
entity."37
To guide the application of the pertinent anti-discrimination provisions of Title II, the ADA defines more than the term "disability."38
According to the Act, the term "public entity," as used in Title II, re-

35.

36.
37.
38.

ticipating in a supervised rehabilitation program," and who no longer
engages in illegal drug use, is not excluded from the definition of "individual with a disability" for purposes of the ADA. See id. § 1221O(b).
While the text of the ADA itself does not provide a list of specific conditions or handicaps that qualify as disabilities within the meaning of the
Act, the Code of Federal Regulations does provide such a list. See generally
28 C.F.R. § 35.104. According to the Code of Federal Regulations, drug
addiction and alcoholism can both constitute a "physical or mental impairment" within the meaning of the ADA. Id. The list of qualifying "physical
or mental impairments" in the Code of Federal Regulations, which includes, among many other conditions, physiological disorders, cosmetic disfigurement, mental retardation, learning disabilities, HN, cancer, and
speech, hearing, and vision impairments, further evidences the broad
reach of the ADA. Id. Despite the provisions in the ADA itself and in the
Code of Federal Regulations for recovering substance abusers as individuals
with disabilities, recovering substance abusers still need to show that their
addictions "substantially limit one or more of their major life activities" in
order to sustain a challenge under the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (B)(C). See also supra note 33.
See MX Group, Inc. v. Covington, 293 F.3d 326,336 (6th Cir. 2002) (observing that potential clients of methadone clinic were disabled within the
meaning of the ADA); Regional Econ. Cmty. Action Program, Inc. v. Middletown, 294 F.3d 35, 46 (2d Cir. 2002) (recognizing that recovering drug
addicts and alcoholics-prospective participants in halfway house treatment programs-were disabled within the meaning of the ADA); Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 896 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that "drug
addiction that substantially limits one or more major life activities is a recognized disability under the ADA"); Buckley v. Consol. Edison Co., 155
F.3d 150, 154 (2d Cir. 1998) (recognizing that a person who has completed
a drug rehabilitation program and is no longer using drugs may be considered disabled within the meaning of the ADA).
See generally 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
Id.
See generally id. § 12131.
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fers generally to any state or local government, or to any division of a
state or local government. 39
Title II similarly defines a "qualified individual with a disability" in
broad terms. 40 For the purposes of Title II, the ADA protects any disabled individual who "meets the essential eligibility requirements" for
anyone seeking to receive the services of, or participate in programs
offered by, a public entityY Most importantly, a disabled individual
who "meets the essential eligibility requirements" of a public entity is
protected by the ADA whether or not the public entity would be required to: (1) make "reasonable modifications to [its] rules, policies,
or practices"; (2) remove "architectural, communication, or transportation barriers"; or (3) provide "auxiliary aids and services" in order to
provide its services to the disabled individual or facilitate the participation of the disabled individual in its programs or activities. 42 The application of the broad definitions of "qualified individual with a
disability" and "public entity" to the language of § 12132 of Title II,
therefore, makes it unlawful for a state or local government, in any of
its varied capacities, to discriminate against the disabled in the provision of its services. 43
.

39. [d. § 12131(1}. More specifically, the term "public entity," as used in Title
II of the ADA, refers to "any department, agency, special purpose district or
other instrumentality of a State or States or local government," as well as
"the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and any commuter authority." Id. § 12131 (I) (B}-(C).
40. See generally id. § 12131(2}.
41. [d.

42. [d.
43. See id. See also id. § 12132. For cases demonstrating the broad sweep of
Title II of the ADA, see generally Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890 (9th Cir.
2002) (holding that parole proceedings were an activity of a public entity
and that "a broad rule categorically excluding parole decisions from the
scope of Title II is not the law"); Hispanic Counseling Ctr., Inc. v. Hempstead,
237 F. Supp. 2d 284 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (granting a preliminary injunction
barring a municipality from preventing a nonprofit substance abuse treatment center from relocating because the treatment center had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of a claim that the zoning
ordinance prohibiting treatment centers in districts zoned for business violated Title II); Calloway v. Glassboro Dep't of Police, 89 F. Supp. 2d 543 (D.N].
2000) (holding that investigative questioning of a suspect by police constituted the services or activities of a public entity and that discrimination
against deaf suspects during such questioning violated Title II); Soto v. Newark, 72 F. Supp. 2d 489 (D.N]. 1999) (holding that a municipal wedding
ceremony was a service of a public entity under the ADA and that the city's
failure to provide an interpreter to a profoundly deaf couple at their wedding ceremony denied the couple the benefit of the services of a public
entity and thus violated Title II); Tyler v. Manhattan, 857 F. Supp. 800 (D.
Kan. 1994) (holding that a city's failure to postpone meetings of a city commission in order to repair a elevator so that a wheelchair-bound citizen
could access meeting denied the citizen the benefit of activities of a public
entity in violation of Title II).
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Remedies Under the ADA

Section 12133 sets out the enforcement provisions of Title 11.44 According to that section, disabled people who experience discrimination in the provision of services of a public entity may seek the same
kinds of remedies available under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 45
The enforcement provisions of the Rehabilitation Act, in turn, provide that the remedies available under that legislation are the same as
those provided by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for violations of its antidiscrimination provisions. 46
Section 2000e-16 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination "based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin" in the
employment practices of the federal government, and provides for the
enforcement of that prohibition through "appropriate remedies, including reinstatement or hiring of employees with or without back
pay."47 Section 2000e-5 sets out the enforcement provisions for the
sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that generally prohibit employment discrimination by any employer, not simply the federal government. 48 That section authorizes, upon a finding of intentional
discrimination in employment practices, injunctive relief and
[S]uch affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may
include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay (payable by the employer,
employment agency, or labor organization, as the case may
44. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 12133.
45. See id. See also Rehabilitation Act of 1973,29 U.S.C. § 794a (2003). Section
12133 of the ADA does not specifically refer to the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, but simply cites the corresponding code section. 42 U.S.c. § 12133.
Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 in order to "provide a statutory basis for the Rehabilitation SeIVices Administration" and "authorize
programs to ... develop and implement comprehensive and continuing
state plans for providing vocational rehabilitation services to handicapped
individuals," and to "promote and expand employment opportunities in
the public and private sectors for handicapped individuals and to place
such individuals in employment." Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No.
93-112, 87 Stat. 355.
46. See 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
47. Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (2001).
48. See id. § 2000e-5. The enforcement provisions of section 2000e-5 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 apply to employment discrimination prohibited by
sections 2000e-2 and 2000e-3 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See id. Section
2000e-2 prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin by any employer, employment agency, labor organization,
or training program (and specifically allows employment discrimination
against members of the Communist Party or others deemed to pose a national security threat). See id. § 2000e-2. Section 2000e-3 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination against people who have
publicly opposed an employer's unlawful practices and prohibits employers
from posting advertisements or notices that indicate a hiring "preference,
limitation, specification or discrimination" on the basis of any race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. [d. § 2000e-3.
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be, responsible for the unlawful employment practice), or
any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate. 49
Neither the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, nor the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 explicitly provides for damages as a remedy for
violations of anti-discrimination provisions,50 but courts have held that
violations of Title II are properly redressed by damages of certain
kinds. According to the relevant case law, compensatory damages are
available to redress violations of Title II when a plaintiff makes a showing of intentional discrimination. 51 Compensatory damages, however,
are not available under Title II of the ADA to redress "mental anguish
and humiliation" alleged to have resulted from a defendant's discriminatory conduct. 52 Finally, punitive damages are not available to redress claims of discriminatory treatment under Title 11. 53

B.

TheFHA

1.

History

In 1968, Congress enacted the FHA in an attempt to address the
pervasive problems of discrimination on the basis of race and national
origin in the sale and rental of housing. 54 In its original form, however, the FHA did not prohibit discrimination against the disabled in
the sale or rental of housing. Based upon its finding that handicapped individuals, like the originally protected classes, "have been
denied housing because of misperceptions, ignorance, and outright
prejudice,"55 Congress amended the FHA in 1988 to prohibit discrimi49. [d. § 2000e-5 (g) (1).
50. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
51. See, e.g., Matthews v.Jefferson, 29 F. Supp. 2d 525, 535-36 (W.D. Ark. 1998)
(observing that because the enforcement provisions of Title II of the ADA
encompass those of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, the "full spectrum of remedies" is available under Title II of the
ADA).
52. See Tyler v. Manhattan, 857 F. Supp. 800, 819 (D. Kan. 1994).
53. See Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 189 (2002) ("Because punitive damages may not be awarded in private suits brought under ... the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, it follows that they may not be awarded in suits brought under
... the ADA and ... the Rehabilitation Act."). See also Harrelson v. Elmore
County, 859 F. Supp. 1465, 1469 (M.D. Ala. 1994).
54. United States v. Plaza Mobile Estates, 273 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1090 (C.D. Cal.
2003). Shelley v. Kraemer provides a clear example of the type of discrimination in housing prevalent at the time of the enactment of the FHA. 334
U.S. 1 (1948). In that case, the Kraemers, white property owners, sought to
enforce against the Shelleys, their Mrican-American neighbors, a restrictive
covenant providing that the Shelleys' land could only be occupied by
whites. [d. at 6-7. The Supreme Court held that judicial enforcement of
such a restrictive covenant constituted state action in violation of the Shelleys' rights under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. [d.
at 21.
55. H.R. REp. No. 100-711, at 18 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N 2173,
2179.
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nation in housing not only on the basis of race and national origin,
but also on the basis of handicap.56
2.

People Recovering from Substance Abuse Problems are Considered People with a Handicap Under the FHA

The FHA protects individuals from discrimination in the sale or
rental of housing on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, familial
status, or national origin."57 In addition to these familiar protections,
however, the FHA also prohibits discrimination in housing on the basis of "handicap."58 The FHA defines "handicap" in precisely the
same broad terms as the ADA defines "disability"-"a physical or
mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, ... a record of having such an impairment,
or ... being regarded as having such an impairment."59
Like its definition of "disability" under the ADA, Congress specifically excluded "current, illegal use of or addiction to a controlled substance" from its definition of "handicap" under the FHA.60 The use of
the word "current" to describe the kind of controlled substance use
that the FHA excludes from the definition of "handicap" seems to indicate that people who are recovering from substance abuse are considered people with a handicap under the FHA, as courts have
consistently held. 61 People who are recovering from substance abuse
56. Id. The 1988 amendment added the current subsection (f) to § 3604 of the
FHA, which includes prohibitions against discrimination in the sale or
rental of dwellings and in the provision of services and facilities in connection with dwellings on the basis of handicap, as well as the current requirements for handicapped-accessible construction and design of multifamily
housing. See id. The 1988 amendment also added the current subsection
(h) to section 3602 of the FHA, which defines "handicap" for the purposes
of the act and excludes current users of illegal drugs from that definition.
See id. See also infra note 59.
57. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2001).
58. See id.
59. Ir!. § 3602(h) (1)-(3); Id. § 12lO2(2) (A), (C) (referring to the ADA description of "individual with a disability").
60. Id. § 3602(h) (3).
61. See Reg'l Econ. Cmty. Action Program, Inc. v. Middletown, 294 F.3d 35, 46
(2d Cir. 2002) (observing that recovering drug addicts and alcoholics were
handicapped within the meaning of the FHA); United States v. S. Mgmt.
Corp., 955 F.2d 914, 917-19 (4th Cir. 1992) (observing that recovering drug
addicts and alcoholics were handicapped within the meaning of the FHA);
Conn. Hosp. v. New London, 129 F. Supp. 2d 123, 125 (D. Conn. 2001)
(recognizing that recovering substance abusers and alcoholics participating
in halfway house treatment programs were handicapped within the meaning of the FHA); Oxford House, Inc. v. Babylon, 819 F. Supp. 1179, 1182
(E.D.N.Y. 1993) ("It is well established that individuals recovering from
drug or alcohol addiction are handicapped under the FHA."); Oxford
House, Inc. v. Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. 450, 459 (D.N]. 1992) ("It is clear
that Congress contemplated alcoholism and drug addiction as being
among the kinds of 'impairments' covered under [the] definition [of handicap in the FHA].").
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are ostensibly no longer "current" users of controlled substances, although there may be some dispute in the medical field as to whether
people recovering from substance abuse are "currently" addicted to
whatever substance they previously abused and remain addicted to
that substance throughout their lives. 62 Read literally, the FHA seems
to permit discrimination in housing against current users of controlled substances and to prohibit discrimination in housing against
recovering substance abusers. 63

3.

Protections of the Disabled Under the FHA

The FHA provides several specific protections to people with handicaps from discrimination in the sale or rental of housing on the basis
of handicap (as well as on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, and national origin).64 Specifically, the Act makes it unlawful to publish any advertisement regarding the "sale or rental of a
dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination
based on ... handicap."65 The Act also prohibits the misrepresentation about a dwelling's availability to an individual based on the individual's handicap.66 Additionally, under the FHA it is unlawful to
make representations "regarding the entry or prospective entry into
the neighborhood of a person or persons of a particular ... handicap"
in an effort to convince that person to sell or rent a dwelling. 67 Discrimination on the basis of handicap in the sale or rental of a dwelling
is prohibited, regardless of whether that discrimination takes place on
the basis of the handicap of the prospective buyer or renter, a person
who intends to live in the dwelling after its sale or rental, or "any person associated with [the] buyer or renter."68
62. The FHA directs readers to 21 U.S.C. § 802 (2000) for definitions of the
terminology to exclude current controlled substance users from the definition of the term "handicap." 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h). That section defines the
term "addict" as "any individual who habitually uses any narcotic drug so as
to endanger the public morals, health, safety, or welfare, or who is so far
addicted to the use of narcotic drugs as to have lost the power of self-control with reference to his addiction." 21 U.S.C. § 802. People recovering
from substance abuse do not seem to qualify as "addicts" as described
under this definition; they no longer habitually use narcotic drugs, and
they are engaged in the active exercise of "self-control with reference to
[their] addictions." See id.
63. The FHA specifically exempts religious organizations and nonprofit organizations "operated, supervised or controlled by or in conjunction with" religious organizations from all anti-discrimination provisions under the FHA
except those relating to race, color, or national origin. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 3607(a). The FHA also permits private clubs to restrict the rental of its
lodgings to its members or to give preference to its members in such rental.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

See id.
See generally id. § 3604-3606.

Id.

~

3604(c).

See id. § 3604(d).

Id. § 3604(e).
Id. § 3604(f)(I)(A)-(C).
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The Project Life decision utilizes the broadest protection of the disabled against discrimination in housing provided by the FHA, prohibiting discrimination "in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or
rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling, because of a handicap."69 The FHA delineates certain types of conduct that constitutes discrimination for the
purposes of § 3604; among those types of conduct is the "refusal to
make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services" in order to facilitate a handicapped individual's use and enjoyment of a particular dwelling. 70 Furthermore, the anti-discrimination
provisions of the FHA are applicable to dwellings owned or operated
by the federal government. 71
4.

Remedies Under the FHA

Section 3613 of the FHA explicitly provides the remedies available
to private persons seeking redress for housing discrimination prohibited by the FHA.72 The FHA provides that a court may grant "any
permanent or temporary injunction, temporary restraining order, or
other order (including an order enjoining the defendant from engaging in [a discriminatory housing practice] or ordering such affirmative action as may be appropriate)" to redress discriminatory housing
practices under the FHA.73 Unlike the enforcement provisions of the
ADA, however, the FHA specifically provides that courts hearing housing discrimination claims under the FHA may award actual and puni69. Id. § 3604(f) (2). Again, such discrimination is prohibited on the basis of a
handicap of the person seeking to buy or rent, a person "residing in or
intending to reside in that dwelling" after sale or rental, or any person associated with the person seeking to buy or rent. Id. § 3604(f) (2) (A)-(C). For
cases demonstrating the broad sweep of the FHA, see generally Dadian v.
Wilmette, 269 F.3d 831 (7th Cir. 2001) (affirming a jury verdict that a village's denial of a hardship permit to build a garage on the front of a home
to plaintiffs suffering from asthma and orthopedic problems constituted
discrimination on the basis of handicap in violation of the FHA); Conn.
Hasp. v. New London, 129 F. Supp. 2d 123 (D. Conn. 2001) (granting preliminary injunction barring municipality from closing a halfway house for recovering substance abusers on zoning grounds because of a likelihood that
the municipality's refusal to accommodate the halfWay house discriminated
against its members in violation of the FHA); United States v. Philadelphia,
838 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (holding that a city's refusal to allow substitution of a side yard for a zoning ordinance requiring a back yard at a
building intended for use as a home for homeless suffering from mental
illness or recovering from substance abuse violated the FHA); Horizon House
Developmental Servs., Inc. v. Upper Southampton, 804 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Pa.
1992) (holding that a zoning ordinance requiring that group homes for the
mentally retarded be spaced at least 1,000 feet apart constituted discrimination on the basis of handicap and thus violated the FHA).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(£)(3)(B).
7l. See id. § 3603.
72. See generally id. § 3613.
73. Id. § 3613(c)(l).
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tive damages. 74 Furthermore, compensatory damages for emotional
distress are recoverable in actions under the FHA.75
C.

The Eleventh Amendment and the Garrett Decision

1.

Eleventh Amendment Sovereign Immunity and Congress's Power
to Abrogate it

Despite the wide scope of protections provided by the ADA and the
FHA against discrimination on the basis of disability, the U.S. Constitution and other acts of Congress can, of course, affect the ways in
which those protections function. The Eleventh Amendment provides the states with sovereign immunity-a private citizen cannot sue
a state in law or equity in federal court. 76 As an additional consequence of the Eleventh Amendment, Congress may not provide a private cause of action for money damages against the states in federal or
state court. 77
The Supreme Court has held, however, that Congress may abrogate
the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity "when it both unequivocally intends to do so and 'act[s] pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority.' "78 While the Court has held that Congress may not
abrogate the states' sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I powers,79 it has also held that Congress may abrogate the states' sovereign
immunity pursuant to the enforcement clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 8o Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the power to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment through "appropriate legislation."81
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., Szwast v. Carlton Apartments, lO2 F. Supp. 2d 777,783 (E.D. Mich.
2000) (sustaining a jury's award of $3,000 in compensatory damages to a
plaintiff who was denied apartment housing because she had children and
observing that the plaintiff's testimony that she felt "crushed, embarrassed,
and ashamed from the rejection" was sufficient evidence of her emotional
distress).
76. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment provides that "the
Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State." Id. The Eleventh Amendment applies
not only to suits by a citizen of one state against another state, but also to
suits by a citizen against his or her own state. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of
Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001).
77. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
78. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363 (quoting Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S.
62, 73 (2000».
79. See id. at 364. See also Kimel, 528 U.S. at 80 (stating that "Congress' powers
under Article I of the Constitution do not include the power to subject
States to suit at the hands of private individuals"); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996).
80. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 364; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 80. See also Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
81. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
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In order for an act of Congress to constitute "appropriate" remedial
legislation under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, it must demonstrate "congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end. "82
Furthermore, a pattern of Fourteenth Amendment violations by the
states themselves must emerge in order for a remedial measure such as
the abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity to constitute a valid
exercise of Congress's § 5 enforcement powers. 83

2.

Congress Abrogated the States' Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Under the ADA

Section 12202 of the ADA provides that "a State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the
United States from an action in [a] Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter."84 Congress, therefore,
abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suits by
private citizens under the ADA. 85
3.

Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett

In its recent decision in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v.
GarrettB 6 -a case that promises to have significant implications for all
future claims brought under the ADA-the Supreme Court held that
Congress's abrogation of the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity
under Title I of the ADA (which prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of disability) was invalid. 87 Applying the "congruence and proportionality" test from City of Boerne v. Flores,88 the Court
held that evidence of states' employment discrimination against the
disabled was insufficient to warrant the extreme remedial measure of
abrogating the states' sovereign immunity.89 It further held that Congress's action in doing so under Title I of the ADA was thus an invalid
exercise of its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers. 90
The Garrett case arose when "Patricia Garrett, a registered nurse ...
employed [by] the University of Alabama in Birmingham Hospital,"
and "Milton Ash[,] ... a security officer [employed by] the Alabama
Department of Youth Services," filed suit against their employers seek82. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365 (quoting Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520
(1997) ).
83. See id. at 368 ("Congress' § 5 authority is appropriately exercised only in
response to state transgressions.").
84. 42 U.S.C. § 12202 (2001).
85. [d.
86. 531 U.S. 356.
87. See id. at 374.
88. 521 U.S. 507,520 (1997).
89. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374.
90. [d. at 374, 374 n.9.
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ing monetary relief for violations of Title I. 91 The Court had previously addressed the constitutionality of other acts of Congress that
abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity,92 but it had not
yet addressed the question of whether the ADA validly abrogated that
immunity.
The Court found that the first requirement for a valid abrogation of
the states' sovereign immunity-that Congress "unequivocally intend
to do so"-was undisputedly met because of the clear language of section 12202 of the ADA. 93 The Court then determined that the second
requirement for a valid abrogation of the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity-that Congress undertake such abrogation pursuant
to a "valid grant of constitutional authority"94-was not met because
abrogation of the states' sovereign immunity in the ADA was not a
valid exercise of Congress's § 5 enforcement power. 95 Even though
the enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the power to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity,96 the Court reasoned that remedial action under the ADA lacked
congruence and proportionality to the injuries at issue,97 holding
"[ t] he legislative record of the ADA ... fails to show that Congress did
in fact identify a pattern of irrational state discrimination in employment against the disabled."98
The Court found that the legislative history surrounding the ADA,
although it describes many general incidences of discrimination
against the disabled, does not provide sufficient evidence of unconstitutional discrimination by the states themselves to render Congress's
abrogation of the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity a valid exercise of its § 5 enforcement power. 99 Furthermore, even though the
91. [d. at 362. Title I of the ADA prohibits "discriminat[ion] against a qualified
individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in
regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other
terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)
(2001). Garrett claimed that her employer discriminated against her when
they required her to give up her position as Director of Nursing and accept
a lower-paying position after she was diagnosed with breast cancer, therefore, taking "substantial" leave from work to undergo treatment. Garrett,
531 U.S. at 362. Ash claimed that he faced discrimination by his employer
when they failed to grant requests to modifY his duties and schedule to
accommodate his chronic asthma and sleep apnea. [d.
92. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000) (holding that
"in the [Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,29 U.S.C. § 623,]
Congress did not validly abrogate the States' sovereign immunity to suits by
private individuals").
93. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363-64.
94. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 373.
95. See id. at 374.
96. [d. at 364.
97. [d. at 374.
98. [d. at 368.
99. See id. at 369.
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specific instances of employment discrimination did involve state action, the action may not have violated the Fourteenth Amendment. lOo
The Court also expressed concern that the remedial provisions of the
ADA lacked congruence and proportionality to the injuries they were
intended to address because the provisions require the states to make
accommodations for the disabled that are not required by the Fourteenth Amendment. lOl Because the legislative history of the ADA
does not identify a pattern of unconstitutional discrimination in employment by the states against disabled individuals and because the
remedies created under Tide I of the ADA were incongruent to any
violations by the states, the Garrett court held that Congress's abrogation of the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity in Tide I is
invalid. 102

4.

Does the Rationale of Garrett Apply to Tide II?

The Garrett decision narrowly held that Title I did not validly abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.103 The
Court specifically declined to decide the issue of whether Title II of
the ADA properly abrogated the states' sovereign immunity.104 The

100. [d. at 370. The Court emphasized that the states' treatment of disabled
individuals in the context of employment was subject only to rational-basis
review. [d. at 367 (stating that the "[s]tates are not required by the Fourteenth Amendment to make special accommodations for the disabled, so
long as their actions toward such individuals are rational"). See also
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (stating
that "[t]he general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will
be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to
a legitimate state interest"). Thus, the Garrett Court observed that whether
the few specific instances of state discrimination against the disabled reflected in the legislative record of the ADA would prove unconstitutional if
subjected to rational-basis review was "debatable." See Garrett, 531 U.S. at
370.
101. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 372. The ADA, the Court observes, requires state
employers to "make existing facilities used by employees readily accessible
to and usable by individuals with disabilities." [d. (quoting 42 U.S.c.
§§ 12112(5)(b), 12111(9)). Moreover, a state employer could constitutionally "conserve scarce financial resources by hiring employees who are able
to use existing facilities." [d. at 372.
102. [d. at 374.
103. [d. at 374 n.9.
104. [d. at 360 n.1. The Court observed that "no party ... briefed the question
whether Title II of the ADA ... is available for claims of employment discrimination when Title I of the ADA expressly deals with that subject" and
that Title II "has somewhat different remedial provisions from Title I." [d.
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lower federal courts are split on the issue,105 and the Supreme Court
has not yet decided it.10 6
Many lower federal courts that have addressed the issue seem to
agree that the rationale of Garrett applies not only to Title I, but also to
Title 11.107 Most significantly, the Fourth Circuit, in Wessel v. Glendening, held after the Project Life decision that "Congress did not validly
abrogate the sovereign immunity of the states when it enacted Part A
of Title II of the ADA."108
Applying essentially the same analysis as that applied by the Supreme Court in Garrett,109 the Wessel majority first inquired as to
whether Congress had "adequately expressed" its intent to abrogate
the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity in Title 11.110 Concluding
that Congress had "adequately expressed" such an intent, I I I the court
then applied the "congruence and proportionality" test to determine
whether Congress's abrogation of the states' immunity constituted a
valid exercise of the enforcement powers granted to it in § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 112 This test is applied in three steps: First,
the court must identify the scope of the constitutional right at issue;
second, the court must conclude that Congress has demonstrated history and a pattern of unconstitutional discrimination by the states;
and lastly, if history and a pattern exist, the court must determine
whether the law is congruent and proportional to the wrong. 1 13 The
m~ority identified the scope of the constitutional right at issue as the
right of disabled people "not to be subject to arbitrary or irrational
exclusion from the services, programs, or benefits provided by the
105. See infra notes 107-125 and accompanying text. The Fourth Circuit was not
required to decide the issue of Eleventh Amendment immunity in the context of Project Life, Inc. v. Glendening because Project Life released its claim
for damages on appeal. 46 Fed. Appx. 147, 150 n.4, 2002 WL 2012545, at *2
n.4 (4th Cir. Sept. 4, 2002).
106. See supra Part C.1-3.
107. See, e.g., Ass'n for Disabled Ams., Inc. v. Fla. Int'! Univ., 178 F. Supp. 2d
1291, 1294 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (holding that the "Eleventh Amendment bars
suit in federal court by an individual against a state under Title II of the
ADA"). This case contains an exhaustive list of decisions with similar holdings. Id. at 1293-94. See also Chaffin v. Kan. State Fair Bd., 348 F.3d 850,
866 (lOth Cir. 2003) ("We agree ... that Title II of the ADA was not a valid
abrogation of the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity."); Doe v. Div. of
Youth and Family Serv., 148 F. Supp. 2d 462, 489 (D.NJ. 2001).
108. 306 F.3d 203, 215 (4th Cir. 2002).
109. See supra notes 86-102 and accompanying text.
1l0. Wessel, 306 F.3d at 208.
llI. Id. (finding the ADA's explicit provision in 42 U .S.C. § 12202 which declares that the states "shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment
to the Constitution of the United States from an action in Federal or State
court" for violations of the ADA "unequivocally expresses [Congress's] intent to abrogate").
112. Id. at 208-09.
113. Id. at 209 (quoting Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365, 368, 372).
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state."114 Additionally, the majority found, as did the Garrett majority,
that Congress's abrogation of the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity lacked the requisite "congruence and proportionality" because
Congress had failed to identify a pattern of unconstitutional conduct
by the states against the disabled and because the remedies provided
by Title II were disproportionate to the conduct. 115
Judge King, however, based his convincing dissent on two primary
objections: 1l6 (1) the majority's "refusal to give proper credit to specific record evidence of discrimination by state entities in public programs";117 and (2) the majority's "denial to Congress of the deference
due when our elected representatives make general findings of fact in
support of legislation."118 The dissent insisted that the legislative record supporting Congress's abrogation of the states' immunity in Title
II is much stronger than the sparse legislative record surrounding Title I, which led to the Garrett Court's conclusion that Congress had
based its abrogation of the states' immunity on an inadequate record
of state discrimination. 11g
In addition to its disagreement with the majority over the adequacy
of the legislative record surrounding Title II, the dissent also attached
significant weight to the fact that the Garrett Court specifically reserved
the issue of the validity of the abrogation of states' immunity under
Title II.120 Furthermore, the dissent stressed the fact that the Garrett
majority itself stated that "[t]he overwhelming majority of [accounts
of state discrimination] pertain to alleged discrimination by the States
in the provision of public services and public accommodations, which
areas are addressed in Titles II and III of the ADA."121 Finally, the
dissent emphasized the fact that whereas the legislative record of the
ADA fails to explicitly state any conclusion by Congress that it had
found a pattern of discrimination in public employment, the legislative record does state that persistent discrimination exists in the area
of public services-the area governed by Title II.122 Thus, the dissent
argued, Congress "did indeed identify a pattern of unconstitutional
state action that justified abrogation of state sovereign immunity with
respect to Title II of the ADA."123
Other lower federal courts have held, as Judge King would have
held, that Title II does constitute a valid abrogation of the states' Elev114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 2lO.
Id. at 2lO-15.
See id. at 215 (King,]., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
See id. at 216.
Id.
Id. (quoting Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370 n.7).
Id. at 217-18; see also supra note 16 and accompanying text.
Wessel, 306 F.3d at 218 (King,]., dissenting).
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enth Amendment immunity.124 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit has staunchly adhered to its pre-Garrett opinions holding that Congress validly abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity.125 Until the Supreme Court issues a definitive ruling on
the issue, lower courts will continue to disagree over whether or not
the states are immune from suits for monetary damages under Title II.

5.

The Doctrine of Ex Parte Young: Injunctive Relief Remains Available Notwithstanding Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Even if Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity prevents a plaintiff from suing the state for damages under Title II, plaintiffs can still
obtain injunctive relief as a remedy for wrongful discrimination by officials of the state. 126 The well-established doctrine of Ex parte Young
provides that "an individual seeking only prospective injunctive relief
for ongoing violations of federal law may bring suit against state officials in federal court."127
Application of the doctrine of Ex parte Young generally proceeds
under a four-part inquiry.128 First, the court must determine whether
the action is against a state official or against the state itself; only in
the former case is injunctive relief available. 129 Second, the court
must examine "whether the alleged conduct of state officials constitutes a violation of federal law."13o Third, the relief sought must be
prospective injunctive relief, or the equivalent of a "retroactive award
of damages impacting the state treasury." 131 Finally, the suit for in124. See Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Servs. Ctr. of Brooklyn, 280 F.3d 98, 111-12
(2d Cir. 2001) (restricting the validity of Congress's abrogation of the
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from monetary suits under Title II
of the ADA to situations in which the plaintiff could establish that the violation at issue was motivated by "either discriminatory animus or ill will due
to disability"); Amos v. Md. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 178 F.3d 212
(4th Cir. 1999) (vacated Dec. 28, 1999).
125. Miranda B. v. Kitzhaber, 328 F.3d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir. 2003). The Ninth
Circuit first upheld Congress's abrogation of the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity in Clark v. Cal., 123 F.3d 1267 (9th Cir. 1997). In that case,
inmates of a state correctional facility alleged that they had suffered discrimination in violation of Title II. Id. at 1269. The Ninth Circuit affirmed
the district court's denial of the state's motion to dismiss on the grounds of
Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. at 1271. The court reaffirmed its
holding two years later in Dare v. California, 191 F.3d 1167, 1175 (9th Cir.
1999). In so doing, the court specifically noted Congress's "extensive factual findings regarding the widespread arbitrary and invidious discrimination which disabled people face" and indicated that it would defer to
Congress's determination of how best to remedy that discrimination. Id.
126. Chaffin v. Kan. State Fair Bd., 348 F.3d 850, 866 (10th Cir. 2003) (interpreting Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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junctive relief must not implicate "special sovereignty interests."132
Thus, where the Eleventh Amendment would otherwise bar a suit
against the state for monetary damages, a plaintiff can still obtain injunctive relief against a state official under the circumstances set out
above.
III.
A.

ANALYSIS
Project Life, Inc. v. Glendening

Project Life, Inc. v. Glendening arose as a result of the unsuccessful
efforts of Project Life, Inc. to find a berth in which to dock the U.S.S.
Sanctuary.I33 Project Life is a non-profit organization that planned to
use the Sanctuary-a decommissioned U.S. navy ship-as a temporary
residential facility for women recovering from substance abuse. I34
In 1994, Project Life began negotiating with the Maryland Port Authority to find a place to dock the Sanctuary in the Baltimore Harbor. 135 While the port authority offered several possible berth
locations to Project Life, the port authority subsequently withdrew
those offers as a result of community opposition to Project Life's presence in the neighborhood. I36
Project Life, along with three women hoping to participate in the
residential program I37 on the Sanctuary, brought suit against Parris N.
Glendening (the Governor of Maryland), the Director of the Maryland Port Authority, and several other defendants. I38 They claimed
violations of the ADA, the FHA, and the Maryland Discrimination in
Housing Act. I39
132. Id. at 866-67 (citing ANR Pipeline Co. v. Lafaver, ISO F.3d 1178 (10th Cir.
1998) (holding that the state's interest in its tax collection system was a
special sovereignty interest)).
133. 139 F. Supp. 2d 703, 705 (D. Md. 2001).
134. See id. Project Life plans to provide "rehabilitation services, including life
skills and job training, for up to 300 women at a time, for rotations of 30 to
90 days." Project Life, Inc. v. Glendening, 46 Fed. Appx. 147, 149,2002 WL
2012545, *1 (4th Cir. Sept. 4,2002).
135. Project Life, Inc. v. Glendening, No. WMN-98-2163, 1998 WL 1119864, at
*1 (D. Md. Nov. 30, 1998) (mem.).
136. See id.
137. Id. The women, Angela Marie Adams, Vanessa Trudy Barlow, and Barbara
Nevette Williams, brought the suit as a class action on behalf of themselves
and other women similarly situated. See id.
138. Id. The original defendants to the action included Parris Glendening,
(Governor of Maryland), David Winstead (the Maryland Secretary of Transportation), Tay Yoshitani (former director of the Maryland Port Authority),
and the Alcohol and Drug Abuse Administration. See id. James White (the
current executive director of the Maryland Port Authority) was later substituted for Tay Yoshitani upon the authorization of the U.S. District Court
for the District of Maryland. See id. at *3 n.5.
139. See Project Life, Inc., 1998 WL 1119864, at *1. Project Life withdrew its claim
under the Maryland Discrimination in Housing Act on March 12, 2001.
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Project Life's Claim Under the ADA

In the suit against the Maryland Port Authority and other state
agencies and officials, Project Life and the class of plaintiffs claimed
that the port authority's delay in leasing a berth to Project Life was the
result of unlawful discrimination against the Sanctuary's intended residents-women recovering from substance abuse-and, thus, a violation of Title 11.140 Project Life claimed that it was being denied "the
benefits of the services, programs or activities of a public entity" because of the disability of the population it intended to serve in violation of § 12132 of the ADA.141
The Project Life court correctly upheld the jury's verdict that the Maryland Port Authority had violated the ADA by delaying its lease of a
berth to Project Life. 142 The services of the Maryland Port Authority
are the services of a public entity; Project Life's suit, therefore, was
properly brought under § 12132 of the ADA. 143 Project Life's proposed clientele are individuals with disabilities under the ADA;144
therefore, the Act prohibits discrimination against Project Life on the
basis of those disabilities. 145
Project Life presented evidence that local elected officials exerted
pressure on the port authority not to enter into a lease with Project
Life for a berth. 146 In the defendant's initial motion to dismiss, they
argued that the delay in leasing a berth to Project Life was not the
result of negative community sentiment or pressure, but rather the
result of the port authority's judgment that the residential nature of
the Sanctuary's programs "would be inconsistent with the existing activities of a busy commercial port."147 Convincing evidence to the
contrary exists, however, in the fact that the port authority imposed an
unusual condition on Project Life-before it could be given a berth
for the Sanctuary, Project Life had to obtain "community support" for
its presence in the neighborhood. 148 Given the imposition of the
"community support" requirement on Project Life, and given the evi-

140.
141.
142.

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Project Life, Inc. v. Glendening, 139 F. Supp. 2d 703, 705 n.2 (D. Md.
2001).
See Project Life, Inc., 1998 WL 1119864, at *1; see also Project Life, Inc., 139 F.
Supp. at 705.
See Project Life, Inc., 1998 WL 1119864, at *1-*2.
See Project Life, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d at 705. The court further stated that "if
it were to make its own factual determination, it too would find that Plaintiff was discriminated against on the basis of the population it intends to
serve." Id. at 707.
See Project Life, Inc., 1998 WL 1119864 at *2. See also supra note 36 and accompanying text.
See Project Life, Inc., 1998 WL 1119864, at *1, *2.
See id. at *1, *2 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12132); see also supra notes 28-31 and
accompanying text.
See Project Life, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d at 70S.
Project Life, Inc., 1998 WL 1119864, at *1.
Id.

278

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 33

dence that local officials attempted to prevent the leasing of a berth to
Project Life by exerting pressure on the port authority,I49 the U.S.
District Court for the District of Maryland had ample support for its
finding that "the real reason ... for the State's refusal to enter into
the lease was the desire of [the] elected officials that the Sanctuary's
programs not be located 'in their backyard.' "ISO The port authority's
and other defendants' "illegal acquiescence" to such negative community sentiment constituted unlawful discrimination under the ADA. IS1
Under § 12133 of the ADA, the court properly found that Project Life
was entitled to an i~unction requiring the Maryland Port Authority to
enter into a lease providing a berth for the Sanctuary.IS2

C.

Project Life'S Claim Under the FHA

In addition to its ADA claim, Project Life also claimed that the Maryland Port Authority's and other defendants' delay in leasing a berth
for the U.S.S. Sanctuary violated the FHA.lS3 The U.S. district court,
in its memorandum opinion on the defendants' initial motion to dismiss, characterized Project Life's claim under the FHA as "unique."IS4
Nonetheless, the court correctly found that the defendant's delay constituted a violation of the FHA. ISS
The FHA prohibits discrimination "in the provision of services or
facilities in connection with [a] dwelling, because of a handicap."ls6
The Sanctuary, although not yet a dwelling, would become a dwelling
if made operational; therefore, the court correctly recognized that
Project Life's claim was properly brought under the FHA.lS7 Another
reason that the claim was correctly brought under the FHA is because
Project Life is seeking access to "parking and utilities" for the operation of the Sanctuary, both of which are services and facilities of a
public entity. ISS
Finally, the court correctly found that the same conduct that was at
issue under Project Life's ADA claim violated the FHA.lS9 In failing to
provide a berth and its "services and facilities," the Maryland Port Authority, and the other defendants, yielded to negative community sentiment and pressure based on prejudice toward substance abusers. I6o
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
Project Life, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d at 708.
See id.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (2001); see also supra notes 44-49 and accompanying
text.
See Project Life, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d at 705.
Project Life, Inc., 1998 WL 1119864, at *2.
See Project Life, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d at 711.
See Project Life, Inc., 1998 WL 1119864, at *2.
See id.
!d.
Project Life, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d at 710-11.
Id. at 711.
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That "acquiescence" constituted discrimination and a violation of the
FHA.161 Under § 3613 of the FHA, therefore, the court properly
granted an injunction requiring the state to provide a berth for the
Sanctuary. 162
D.

Eleventh Amendment

The Project Life court declined to apply the holding of Garrett 163 to
Title II of the ADA and, thus, allowed the jury's nominal award of
twelve dollars to stand. 164 The court noted "the split among the circuits as to" the issue of Congress's abrogation of the states' sovereign
immunity in Title II, but it chose to follow the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in a subsequently vacated case that provides no primary authority.165 Amos v. Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional
Services 166 was the only occasion on which the Fourth Circuit had, at
the time Project Life was decided, addressed the issue of the validity of
the abrogation of the states' immunity in Title 11.167 That case, in a
laconic analysis of whether thirteen Maryland prison inmates' Title II
claim against various state departments and officials was subject to the
defense of sovereign immunity, held that Maryland's sovereign immunity had been validly abrogated under Title II and that Maryland was
subject to suit in the case. 168 The Project Life court recognized that
Amos was subsequently vacated,169 but based its decision of the sovereign immunity issue on that case because it found the reasoning in
Amos "compelling."170
Unfortunately for future plaintiffs in Project Life's position, the
Fourth Circuit's subsequent decision in Wessel forecloses the possibility
161. /d. The court also noted: "[A] decision made in the context of strong, discriminatory opposition becomes tainted with discriminatory intent even if
the decision makers personally have no strong views on the matter." Id.
(quoting Innovative Health Sys. v. White Plains, 117 F.3d 37, 49 (2d Cir.
1997».
162. See 42 U.S.C. § 3613. See also supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
163. Garrett held that Title I of the ADA did not validly abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett,
531 U.S. 356, 374 n.9 (2001).
164. See Project Life, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d at 707 n.5.
165. Id. Also supporting its decision not to apply the holding of Garrett to Title
II of the ADA was the fact that the Garrett Court had specifically declined to
decide the issue of whether the abrogation of the states' sovereign immunity in Title II was valid. Id.
166. 178 F.3d 212 (4th Cir. 1999).
167. Project Life, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d at 707 n.5.
168. Amos, 178 F.3d at 223. The court found that Title II was a valid abrogation
of the states' sovereign immunity because Congress "unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity" and because
"the ADA is a valid exercise of [Congress's] power under the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id.
169. See Amos, 205 F.3d 687.
170. See ProjectLife, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d at 707 n.5.
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of recovering damages from any state in the Fourth Circuit for violations of Title 11.171 A strong argument exists, however, that Wessel was
wrongly decided, that the rationale of Garrett is limited to Title I of the
ADA, and that Congress's abrogation of the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity remains valid with respect to Title II. This argument
is exemplified in the opinions of other federal jurisdictions that have
allowed individuals to sue the state for damages under Title II even
after Garrett,172 as well as in Judge King's dissenting opinion in
Wessel. 173
Although Wessel must control in Maryland, the Supreme Court has
recently taken the opportunity to definitively decide whether Congress validly abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity
under Title 11.174 The question should be decided in the affirmative.
Because Congress explicitly found that a pattern of state discrimination in public services against the disabled, its abrogation of the states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to Title II is an appropriate exercise of its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers and
should be allowed to stand. 175
Regardless of whether the Eleventh Amendment barred the plaintiffs' suit for damages, Project Life remains a valid decision. As the district court observed, a jury made a finding of liability, and despite the
nominal award of twelve dollars in damages, the heart of the relief
granted to Project Life is the detailed injunction ordering the Maryland Port Authority to provide a berth for the U.S.S. Sanctuary.176
Under the doctrine of Ex parte Young, private individuals can sue state
officials for injunctive relief, even though the Eleventh Amendment
prevents them from suing the states for money damages. l77 Even the
Garrett Court noted that its holding only affected suits against the
states for money damages, and that injunctive relief was still available
to aggrieved individuals. 178 The district court, then, acted properly
even if the Eleventh Amendment barred the nominal damages
awarded to Project Life. 179
171.
172.
173.
174.

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

See supra notes 107-115 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 124-125 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 116-123 and accompanying text.
On January 13, 2004, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the case
of Lane v. Tennessee, 315 F.3d 680 (6th Cir. 2003), cm. granted 123 S. Ct.
2622 (2003). See Tennessee v. Lane, No. 02-1667, 2004 WL136390 (U.S.
Jan. 13,2004).
Id.
See Project Life, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d at 706, 71l.
See supra notes 126-132 and accompanying text.
See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 n.9.
Indeed, the Fourth Circuit, in its unpublished per curiam opinion on the
state's appeal, rejected the state's claim that Project Life's release of the
damage award voided the jury's finding of liability. See Project Life, Inc. v.
Glendening, 146 Fed. Appx. 147,150,2002 WL 2012545, at *2 n.4 (4th Cir.
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CONCLUSION

It is hoped that the Supreme Court will in the future provide guidance on whether Congress validly abrogated the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity in Title II of the ADA and, thus, whether plaintiffs can institute monetary damages against the state for violations of
that statute. Whatever the outcome of that dispute, however, recovering substance abusers can rest assured that they can still obtain some
protection from state violations of the ADA in the form of injunctive
relief. The decision of the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland in Project Life v. Glendening embodies this protection. By holding
that a denial of the services and facilities of a public entity as a result
of acquiescence to community animus toward substance abusers constitutes unlawful discrimination in violation of the ADA and the FHA,
the court reaffirmed its commitment to the underlying purposes of
those acts-the elimination of discrimination against the disabled.

Sarah D. Bruce

Sept. 4, 2002). The Fourth Circuit affinned the District Court's decision.
Id. at 151, 2002 WL 2012545, at *3.

